MooreExternalWorld, Filozofia, Filozofia
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GEORGEEDWARD
MOORE
PHILO$OPHIGAII
PAPERS
COLLIER
BOOKS
NEW YORK,
N.Y.
Chopter
7
Proof of an Extemal World
/
127
The words
'it
.
. .
remains a
scandal
to philosophy . . .
that we are unable . . ." would, taken strictly, imply that, at
the moment at which he wrote them, Kant himself was
unable to produce a satisfactory proof of the point in
question.
But I think it is unquestionable that Kant
himself
did not
think that he
personally
was at the time unable to
produce
such a proof. On the contrary, in the immediately
preceding
sentence,he has declared th4! he has, in the second edition
of his Critique, to which he-ls now writing the Preface,
given
a 'tigorous
proof"
of this very thing;
and has added that he
believesthis
proof
of his to be "the only
possibleproof." It
is true that in
this
preceding
sentence
he does not describe
the proof which he has given as a proof of "the existence of
things
outside
of us" or of
"the
existenceof the things outside
of us," but describesit instead as a
proof
of "the objective
reality of orrter infuition." But the context leaves no
doubt
that he is using these two phrases, "the objective reality
of
outer intuition" and "the exislenccof things
(or'the things')
outside of us," in such a way that whatever is
a proof of the
first
is also necessarily a
proof
of the second.
We must, there
fore, suppose
that when
he
speaksas rt we
are unable to
give
a satisfactory proof, he does not mean to say that he
himself'
as well as others, is at the moment unable; but rather that'
until he discovered the proof which he has
given,
both
he
himself and everybody else were unable. Of course, if he is
right in
thinking
that he has
grven
a safisfactory
proof, tho
state of
things
which he describes came to an end
as soon as
his
proof
was
publishgd.
As soon as that
hapBened, anyotre
who read it was able to
give
a satisfactory
proof by simply
repeating
that which
Kant had grven, and the 'scandal' to
philosophy had been
removed
once for all.
If, therefore, it were certain that the
proof
of the
point in
question given
by Kant in the second edition
is a satisfactory
proof,
it would be certain that at least one satisfactory
proof
can be
given;
and all that would
remain of the question which
I said I
proposed
to discuss
would be, firstln the
question
as
to what sort of a
proof
this
of Kanfs is, and secondly
the
question whether
(contrary
to Kant's own opinion) there
may
not perhaps be other proofg of the same
or of a different
sort,-whicl are also satisfactory.
lg1 t think it is by no means
certain that Kant's
proof is satisfactory. I
rhink
it is by no
means certain that he did succeed
in removing once for all
the state of affairs
which he considered to be
a
scandal
to
philosophy. .A.adI ftink, therefore, that
the question whether
Proof
of
qn
Ex?ernqf
World
Pure
Reason
some
words
o""ur,;il-i-.d
iri
professor
Kemp
to the second
edition
of
Kant,s Critique
ol
Smith's
translation,
are rendered'u,
toiio*.,
r
B xxxix,
note:
Kemo Sgrith,
n._11:The German
words
are
..so
Dasein
der
Dinge
ausser
uns. .
. blossauf
Gl"ub;;;;;"t_"J
",,
miissen,
und
wenn
es
jemand
einfiillt es,zu
bezweifef",
inm
t"il-." genugtuenden
Beweis
entgegenstellen
zu
kcinnen-"
t26
IN rns eREFAcE
bleibtesimmer
ein
Sliandaloiir-t4*"ni";:':':";das
128
/
Philosophical
PaPers
Proofof an ExternalWorld
/
129
scendental
sense,"by calling them outrighl things which
aie
to be met with in space."
plants of
aU sorts, stones,mountains, the
sun, the moon, stars,
and planets,
housesand other buildings, manufactured
articles
of all sorts-chairs,
tables, pieces
of
paper,
etc., are
all
of
them "things
which are to be met with in space." In short,
all things of
the sort that
philosophers
have been used to call
"physical objects,"
"material thingsr" or "bodies" obviously
come under this head. But
the
phrase
"things that are to be
met
with in space" can be naturally
understood as applying
also
in caseswhere the names.
"physical object," "miterial
thing," or
"body" can hardly be applied.For
instance,shadows
naturally
understood as synonymous with
'\ryhatever can be
met with
in space," 6ad
rhis
is an
expression which can
quite
properly be
understood to include shadows. I wish
the
phrase
"things
which are to bc md with in space" to be undirstood
in this wide sense;
so that if a proof can be found that there
ever have been as rnany
as two diffcrent shadows it will
follow at once
that
there
have been at least two "things which
were to be met with in space,"
and this
proof
will be as
good
a proof
of the point in question as would be
a
proof
that there
have
been at least two "physical objects"
of no matter what
sort.
The phrase
"things
which
are to be met with in space"can,
therefore, be naturally
understood as having a very wide
think, seryeto make
still clearer what sort of things it is with
regard to which I wish
to
ask
what
proof,
if any, can be given
that there are such things.
The other phrase which Kant usesas
if
it
were equivalent
180
,/
PhilosophicalPapers
to
"things
which are to be met with in space" is used by him
in the sentenge
immsdialsly
preceding that
previously quoted
in which he declaresthat the expression
"things
outside
of us"
"carries with it an unavoidableambiguity"
(A
373).In
this
preceding
sentence he says that an "empirical
object" "is
called external, if it is
presented (vorgestellt) in space." He
treats, therefore, the
phrase
"presented
in space" as if it
were equivalent to "to be met with
in space." But it is easy
to find examples ef "things," of which
it
can
hardly be denied
that they are "presented
in space," but of which it could,
quite naturally, be
emphatically
denied that they are "to
be
met
with
in
space." Consider,
for instance, the following
description of one set of circumstances under which
what
some psychologists have called a
"negative
after-image"
and
others a "negative after+ensation" can be obtained. "If,
after
leoking steadfasflyat a white
patch
on a
black
ground,
the
eye be turned to a white
ground,
a
grey patch is seen for
somelittle time."
(Foster's
Text-book ol
Physiology,rv, iii, 3,
Proof
of an Erternal World
/
l8l
expressedby saying that the latter were not "to
be met with
in space." And one reason why this is so is, I think'
plain. To
say that so and so was at a
given
time "to
be met with in
space" naturally suggeststhat there
are
conditions
such that
any one who fulfillgd them might, conceivably,
have
"per-
ceived"
the
"thid$" in
question-might have seen it, if it was
a visible object, have felt it, if it was a tangible one, have
heard
it,
if it was a sound, have smelt it, if it was a smell.
When I say that the white four-pointed
paper
star, at which
I looked steadfastly,was a "physical object" and was "to be
met with in space,"I
am
implying tha! anyone,who had been
in the room at the time, and who had normal eyesight
and a
normal senseof touch, might have seenand felt it. But, in
the
caseof those
grey
after-imageswhich I saw, it
is not
con-
ceivablethat any
one besides
myself should haveseenany one
of them. It
is, of course,
quite
conceivable
that
other
people,
if they had been in the room
with
me at the time, and had
carried out the srme experiment which I carried out would
have seen grey after-images very like one of those which I
saw: there is no absurdity in supposingeven that they might
have seen after-images exactly like on of those which I saw.
But there is an absurdity in supposing that any one of the
after-inages
which I saw could also have been seen by
any-
one else: in
supposing that two difierent
people
can
ever see
the
very
same aftevimage. One reason, then, why
we should
say that none of those grey after-images which I saw was "to
be met with in space," although each of them was certainly
"presented
in space" to me, is simply that none of them could
conceivably have been seen by anyone else. It is hatural so to
understand the
phrase
"to be met with in space," that to say
of anything which a man
perceived
that it was to be
met
with
in spaceis
to say that
it might have beenperceivedby others
as
well as
by
the man in
question.
Negative after-images of the
kind
described are, therefore,
one exrQnpleof
"things"
which, thougb they must be allowed
to be "plesented in space," are nevertheless rro,
"to
be met
with in space," and are not
"external
to our minds" in the
sense
with
which we shall be concerned.
And two
other
im-
portant
examples may be
given.
The
frst is this. It is well
known that people sometimessee
things double, an
occurrence
which has also been described
by psychologistsby saying that they have a "doublc
image,"
or two
"images,"
of some object at which they are looking.
In such casesit would certainly be
quite
natural to say that
time-I not only saw a
grey patch,
but I
saw it oz the white
ground,
and also this
grey patch
was of
roughly the same
shape
as the white four-pointed star
at which I had "looked
steadfastly"
just
before-it also was a four-pointed star. I
repeated this simple
experiment
successfully several
times.
Now each of those grey four-pointed stars, one
of which I
saw in each experiment, was what is called an "after-image"
or "after+e[sation"; and can anybody deny that
each of these
after-images
can be
quite properly
said to
have been "pre-
sented
in space"?I saw each of them on
a real white back- ,
ground,
and,
if so,-each of
them
was
"presented"
on a real
white background. But though they were
"presented
in space"
everybody, I ffiink, would feel that it was
gravely
misleading
to say that they were
"to
bp
met with in space."
The white
star at which I "looked sieadfastly," the
black ground on
which I
saw
it,
and
the white
ground
on
which I saw the
after-images,were, of course,
"to
be met with in space": they
were, in fact,
"physical
objects" or surfacesof
physical
objects.
But one important difierencebetweenthem, on the one hand,
and the
grey
after-images, on the other, san be
quite naturally
182
/
Philosophlcal
PaPerg
Proof
of
an External World'
/
l3g
pains,
double
images,
and negative after-imagesof the sort I
described
are so. If
you
look at an electric light and then
closeyour
eyes,it sometimeshappensthat
you
see,fol some
little tilie, against
the dark background which
you
usually see
when your
eyes
are
shut, a bright
patch
similar in shape to
the light at
which
you
have
just
been looking. Such a bright
patch, if you see one, is another
example of what some
psy-
chologistshave called "after-images" and others
"after-sensa-
tions"; but,
rnli1"
the negativeafter-images
of
which I spoke
'before, it is seenwhen your eyesare shut. Of such an after-
image,
seenwith closedeyes,some philosophersmight be in-
clined to say that this image too was "presentedin space,"al-
though
it is certainly not "to be met with in space." They
would be inclined
to say that it is "presentedin space," be-
cause it certainly
is
presented
as at some little distance from
the
person
who is
seeing
it: and how
can a thing be
presented
as'at some little distancefrom me, without being "presented
in space?" Yet there is an imFortant
difference between such
after-images,seen with closed eyes, and after-images
of
the
sort I
previously
dEscribed---a
difterence
which might lead
other philosophers
to deny that these after-images, seen with
closed
eyes, are "presented in space" at all. It is a difierence
whish can be expressed by saying that when your eyes are
shuf you are not
seeing any
part
of
physical
space at all<f
the space which is
referred to when we talk of "things which
are to be met with
in space."
An
after-image seen with closed
eyescertainly is presented
in
a space,but it may be questioned
whether it is proper to say that it is preoented ia space.
It is clear, tlen, I
rhink,
that by no means everything which
can naturally be said to be "presentedin space" can also be
naturally said
to !6 "a thing which is t9 be met with in space."
Some
of the 'things," which are
presented
in space, are very
emphatically not
to be
met
with in spacei or, to use another
.
pbrase, which may be used
to convey the
same notion,
they
\re emphaticLfly not
"physical
realities"
at all. The concep-
tion "presentetl in space" is therefore, in one respect, much
wider than the conception "to be met with in space"; many
"things" fall under the first conception which do not fall un-
der the
second-many after-images,one at least of the
pair
of
"images" seen whenever anyone sees double, and most
bodily pains, alc
"presented
in space,"
though
none of them
are to be met with in space. From the fact that a
"thing"
is
presented
in space, it by no means follows that it is to be met
with in space.But
just
as the frst conception is, in one tespect,
I
ttr1
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